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This paper examines how bank competition affects the amount of credit provided to 
small businesses using both the loan turndown rate and the size of granted loans and 
L/Cs. Using 2003 National Survey of Small Business Finance data, we show that 
commercial banking in concentrated banking markets are more likely to reject loan 
applications. Moreover, the size of granted loans is found to be significantly smaller 
in concentrated markets. Finally, we show that the total limit of L/Cs that a firm has 
is also significantly smaller for firms in concentrated banking markets. Our finding 
challenges a notion that credit market competition may be inimical to the formation 
of mutually beneficial relationships between firms and specific creditors. We do not 
find any evidence that bank concentration is instrumental in building relationship 
banking and our results suggest the opposite.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
Whether bank competition affects borrowing firms is a lively topic of research. Conventional 
wisdom that monopolistic banks would take advantage of their market power and adversely affect 
the credit availability is challenged by recent studies in relationship banking. Petersen and Rajan 
(1995) is a seminal paper not only because it empirically shows the potential benefits of 
relationship banking to young firms but also because its model and empirical evidence explicitly 
ties the strength of relationship banking to the degree of that banks’ market power. It makes a 
strong case that “credit market competition may be inimical to the formation of mutually 
beneficial relationships between firms and specific creditors.” (p.407) According to this point of 
view, more inter-bank competition means less relationship banking and, more importantly, less 
favorable terms of credit to young and small firms. Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) reinforced 
this view by showing that bank competition is less favorable to emergence of new firms.  
However, this view is challenged by many recent studies. Boot and Thakor (2000) shows 
that a more competitive environment may encourage banks to become more client-driven and to 
customize services, thus focusing more on relationship banking, since an orientation toward 
relationship banking can make a bank more unique relative to competitors and therefore alleviate 
the pressure of price competition. Cestone and White (2003) points out that monopolistic banks 
may favor their established borrowers over new borrowers because banks want to protect the 
future profitability of firms with an established lending relationship. In this case, when the market 
is less competitive, lenders may have less of an incentive to finance new comers. From 
borrowers’ side, Boot (2000) warns that the threat of being informationally captured by the bank 
may make the firms reluctant to borrow from the bank, suggesting that relationship banking does 
not necessarily means that small firms will get more credit. 
The amount of empirical research on the topic is relatively lacking and provides equally 
contradicting results. Petersen and Rajan (1995) examines the use of trade credit to assess the 
credit availability to firms across bank concentrations to show that firms in concentrated banking 
markets are less credit-constrained. Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) reinforced this view by 
showing that bank competition is less favorable to emergence of new firms. On the other hand, 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) focuses on the effect of banking market concentration on firm sizes 
to show that potential entrants face greater difficulty gaining access to credit in concentrated 
banking markets than those in competitive banking markets. Berger, Rosen and Udell (2007) and 
Craig and Hardee (2007) also shows that small firms in areas dominated by large banks are less 
likely to hold debt and if they do hold debt, the level of debt-to-asset ratio is significantly lower. 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic(2004), using international data, finds that bank 
concentration increases financing obstacles, with stronger effect for small and medium firms. 
Also, several recent studies show that increased bank competition caused by deregulation had 
positive effects on various aspects of economy such as local economic growth (Jayaratne and 
Strahan 1996), entrepreneurship (Black and Strahan, 2001) and business cycle volatility (Morgan, 
Rime, and Strahan, 2001). 
Using both OLS and Heckman two-step procedure model to correct for sample selection, 
this paper tracks both loan rejection rates and the size of granted loans to small firms across 
banking market concentrations. Estimates show that not only are the banks in concentrated bank 
markets more likely to turn down a loan application but also that the average size of granted loans 
is smaller than that in competitive markets. We also find that the bank concentration effect is 
stronger in ‘relationship-based’ loans (new line of credits (L/C) and renewed L/Cs) compared to 
other ‘transactional’ loans such as mortgages and equipment loans. Finally, we also find that the 
total limit of L/Cs that a firm can have is also significantly smaller for firms in concentrated 
banking markets. This difference is more pronounced among young firms. Underlying differences 
in firm and loan characteristics and regional/industrial characteristics across markets are carefully 
controlled for all the estimates and do not appear to explain our findings.    
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present data and 
describe our methodology used for hypothesis test. In the third section, estimates are discussed 
further and we present and examine alternative explanations. Finally, we conclude with 
suggestions for future research.  
 
2. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
The data in this study is obtained from the 2003 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances. The target population of the survey consists of U.S. domestic, non-farm, for profit, 
nonfinancial, nongovernmental small businesses with fewer than 500 employees that were in 
operation as of December 31, 2003. Out of 4,240 total firms in the sample, 1575 reported loan 
applications to financial institutions1 between January of 2003 and December of 2004 and 1453 
of them were granted. Out of those 1453 granted applications, 1155 applications to commercial 
banks and 877 applications were L/C applications (228 new and 649 renewal applications).  
One unique feature of 2003 data set is that it includes five implicates with each implicate 
including 4,240 firms. Across implicates, the values of all reported variables remain constant, but 
the values of imputed variables may differ. This allows us to obtain better estimates by adjusting 
the estimated standard errors and confidence intervals to account for the additional variance that 
imputation may cause. All of the estimates reported in this paper are calculated using Rubin 
(1987)’s method of combining estimates from five imputations. Variable definitions and simple 
statistics are provided in Table 1. 
To investigate how bank competition affects the amount of credit provided to small 
businesses, we first analyze the size of Most Recent Loans (MRL) across banking market 
concentrations. Then, we perform a logistic regression to check whether our findings in the loan 
size regressions are driven by the differences in loan turn down rates across bank concentration. 
To measure the degree of bank competition in the market, we use the Herfindhal index of 
commercial bank deposit concentration (HHI) as a proxy. NSSBF data reports a broad 
categorization of the HHI: whether the HHI is less than 0.1, between 0.1 and 0.18, or greater than 
0.18. One potential problem with this categorization is that the first category – most competitive 
market - is very small (only 6.7% of the sample) compared to middle (46.6%) and the most 
concentrated (46.7%). So, for baseline results we focus on the difference between the markets 
whose HHI is larger than 0.18 (we refer to the markets as concentrated markets) and other 
markets whose HHI is less than 0.18, which includes both the middle markets and the most 
competitive markets (we refer to the markets as competitive markets). This way, we can compare 
two groups that fairly evenly divide the sample.  
Another important concern about the use of HHI as a measure of banking market 
concentration is that due to recent banking market deregulations such as Riegle-Neal Act, loan 
market may not be local and therefore county-level HHI may not effectively capture the degree of 
concentration in loan markets. (For example, Peterson and Rajan, 2003) When we examine our 
sample, however, out of total 1453 most recent loan applications, 1345 firms (92.5%) applied to a 
bank that is located within 10 mile radius and 1283 firms (88.3%) within 5 mile radius. In case of 
                                                 
 
L/C applications, 822 out of total 845 L/C applications (97.2%) are to banks in 10 mile radius and 
797 firms (94.3%) are to banks within 5 mile radius. So, for most small businesses, the loan 
market is still local and at the very least it is the case for the small firms in our sample. Given that 
HHI index provided in SSBF data is county-level measure of deposit concentration, it is still a 
proper measure of loan market concentration. Moreover, we will examine the robustness of our 
findings by dropping loan applications to banks that are more than 5 and 10 miles away. 
We also restrict the sample to loans that are applied between January of 2003 and December 
of 2004 in order to minimize the timing problem. The HHI index provided in the data set is 
derived from December, 2003 values. By restricting the sample we are able to make a closer, 
albeit imperfect, alignment between the credit market concentration at the time of loan 
application and the HHI index in the data.  
A quick look at the summary statistics in Table 1 shows that the log average (natural log is 
used to suppress the effect of statistical outliers) granted loan size is 12.13 in competitive 
markets, while in concentrated markets the average total institutional loan is smaller at 11.91. 
When we perform univariate regressions, estimates in Table 2 also show that loans made in 
concentrated banking markets seem to be smaller than those in competitive markets by about 19 
(for bank loans) to 22 percent (for all institutional loans) and the difference is more pronounced 
among loans made to young firms.   
In order to examine the topic in a more thorough manner, we first test whether or not the 
granted loan size is significantly different across markets, which has the following generic form: 
Li =  iii uxbHa +++ β                                                (1) 
where Li  is the size of a granted loan for firm i, Hi is a dummy variable for the most concentrated 
market, xi  is a vector of other possible exogenous influences on indebtedness (with β  its vector 
of estimated coefficients) and ui is the random error.   
One potential problem with focusing on loan amount is that there might be a selection bias if 
there is correlation between bank concentration and loan turndown rate. As we can see in the 
following section, the banks in concentrated banking markets are more likely to reject loan 
applications of young firms, especially L/C applications. In this case, average quality of firms in 
the concentrated market might be better than that of firms in competitive market, which may 
affect the size of granted loans. To deal with this problem, we perform Heckman two-step 
procedure.2  
 
2.1. Control Variables 
The use of a Most Recent Loan (MRL) variable as a dependent variable allows us to control 
for various aspects of the firm, the owner and firm-bank relationship variables in addition to loan 
characteristics: When regarding firm characteristics, we expect total asset and total sales of the 
firm to have a positive effect on loan size. For a measure of a firm’s profitability, we use log 
value of the firms profit share (profit/sales) and for those firms that reported negative profit we 
converted it into zero and added dummy variable for having a negative profit. In case of the 
firm’s age (in log form), we expect a negative coefficient because young firms need more credit 
to establish their business than do older, more established firms. We also added controls for sales 
changes compared to the last fiscal year,3 its D&B credit ranking and its organizational form such 
as proprietorship and corporation. Owner variables include the weighted average of the owners’ 
education, years of experience and the natural log of the wealth of the primary owner, including 
the value of the owner’s home. We also added controls for African-American ownership because 
many studies (Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman, 2003; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005) find 
that blacks are discriminated against in small business credit markets.  
To control for firm-bank relationships, we use the length of relationship and the distance 
from the bank to which firms applied for loans (all in log form) along with the number of 
financial institutions firms have dealt with. Also following Cole (1998), we controlled for the use 
of financial services – checking account, cash management, credit, trust and brokerage services - 
provided by the bank to which the firm submitted its loan application.  
For loan characteristics, we controlled for the loan type, the collateral required and the loan 
maturity. The loan interest rate is also used to control for the assessed risk of a loan not fully 
captured by D&B credit rating. Lastly, to control for regional and industry level differences, we 
added dummy variables for census region, MSA status (the only two geographical identifiers 
available) and 1 digit SIC codes. 
 
3. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
The estimates from Equation (1) are reported in Table 3. Heckit estimates in column 1, 
which are based on all of the granted loans in the sample, show that after controlling for firm, 
owner and loan characteristics as well as firm-bank relationship variables, the size of the granted 
loan is smaller in concentrated banking markets than in competitive banking markets. We get 
consistent result when we exclude loans from non-bank institutions in order to focus on the 
relationship between commercial banks and small businesses, which is reported in column 2. 
Also, OLS estimates are consistent with Heckit estimates, though they tend to be little bit smaller 
than Heckit estimates. Effects reported in both columns are economically meaningful: taken 
literally, the size of loans granted in the concentrated market is on average about 17 to 21 percent 
smaller than those in other markets.  
When we divide the sample into L/Cs, which is more “relationship-based” and other 
‘transactional’ loans, estimates reported in column 3 and 4 show that the bank concentration 
effect is stronger in the L/C sample both in terms of statistical significance and magnitude, while 
the effect is smaller and insignificant in other ‘transactional’ loans sample. Estimates in Table 3 
suggest that small firms in concentrated bank markets, according to our estimates, get less credit, 
not more and the banks in concentration markets are especially parsimonious in providing 
‘relationship-based’ loans.  
Also, the fact that the bank concentration effect is stronger in L/C sample suggests that our 
finding is driven by credit supply of banks, not by loan demand of firms. When a firm gets an L/C 
from a bank, the firm pays interests only for the amount they actually borrowed, not for the 
maximum limit of the L/C that the firm can borrow from the L/C. Borrowing firms, therefore, 
have little incentive to limit the size of L/C voluntarily and unlike other loans, it is usually bank 
that sets the maximum amount a firm can borrow from a L/C, based on various criteria. This 
finding challenges what Petersen and Rajan (1995) observed using trade credit usage and loan 
interest rates.  
Estimates in Table 3 also indicate that other firm and loan variables have predicted signs: 
First, credit rating of a firm displays a significant positive effect on loan sizes, while the interest 
rate shows a significant negative effect. Firms seem to borrow more when they are young 
probably for initial investment, as captured by the significant negative coefficient of the firm age 
variable. Both total assets and total sales display a significant positive relationship with the 
granted loan size while profit rate has a negative but insignificant coefficient, which may suggest 
that firms may prefer retained profit to bank loans. Owner variables in general did not show 
strong effect on the loan size except the wealth of primary owner, which displayed a significant 
positive effect. Estimates on service usage dummy variable also show that the use financial 
service may increase the size of loans granted. Interestingly, other relationship variables such as 
the number of financial institutions dealt with and the length of the relationship between the bank 
and the firm are not significant while the distance from the bank show significant positive effect, 
especially on the size of other loans.  
   
3.1. Robustness Check 
The evidence presented thus far suggests that controlling for the observable measures of 
firm, loan and relationship characteristics, firms in most concentrated markets borrow less. This 
section adds additional control variable to the model to test the robustness of this finding.  
First, there is a potential endogeneity problem stemming from using loan interest rate as a 
control variable. Many researches show both positive (Berger, Rosen and Udell , 2007) and 
negative (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) correlation between banking market concentration and loan 
interest rates. When we examine the effect of banking market concentration on loan interest rate 
using this sample, however, we did not find any significant correlation between banking market 
concentration and loan rates.(not shown) Also, when we rerun baseline regressions without 
controlling for loan interests, it does not affect our findings. In fact, as we can see in Table 3-1, it 
made bank concentration effect stronger, discounting the possibility that endogeneity is driving 
our result.      
Second, in the baseline regressions, we assumed that the firms’ investment opportunities do 
not differ with concentration of banking market. It is possible, however, that in areas where the 
local economy is booming, banks may open up more branches and de novo banks may enter the 
bank market, which may create a positive association between investment opportunity and bank 
competition. Assuming that firms with sales growth should also have more investment 
opportunities, SSBF 2003 provides four different sets of dummy variables that can provide 
information on investment opportunities: Profit  change compared to the prior year (PROFIT_1) 
compared to 3 years before (PROFIT_3), sales change compared to the prior year (P3) compared 
to 3 years ago (P3_1).4 However, summary statistics of these variables in Table 4 do not show 
any evidence that firms in competitive banking markets have improved sales or profitability 
across banking markets: Percentage of firms reported either increase or decrease of sales and 
profit over 1-3 year periods is remarkably similar across banking markets. In Table 1, we can also 
see that the level of profit, Ln(ProfitShare), is very similar across banking markets.  
Moreover, when we included dummy variable for PROFIT_1 in the baseline regression, the 
result in Table 3 does not indicate that market concentration captures the difference in investment 
opportunities: Coefficients of the firms’ profit growth dummies are insignificant and have the 
wrong sign (firms with a profit decrease have a bigger loans than firms reported profit increase).5 
We also ran another regression without firms that reported profit decrease but the result did not 
change at all (not shown). Lastly, for an alternative test on the investment opportunities, we 
created the ‘industry (1 digit SIC code) x division’ dummy variables, to use in place of separate 
industry and census region dummies. This creates indicators for each industry (1 digit SIC code) 
in each census region, generating 81 dummy variables. When we added these additional dummies 
to baseline regression, in the second column of Table 4 the concentration coefficient only slightly 
decreased and remains statistically significant.6  
To summarize, we did not find any evidence that there is substantial differences in 
investment opportunities across banking markets and introduction of additional control variables 
that might capture potential differences in investment opportunities did not produce any 
qualitative changes in our findings, discounting the possibility that our finding is driven by 
differences in investment opportunities. 
Third, we need to consider a possibility that the correlation between bank concentration and 
the urban/rural location of the firm may drive the baseline results. In the sample, all firms in the 
most competitive market are located is urban area, while all firms in rural area which take up 
about 20 percent of the total sample belong to the mid market or the most concentrated market. 
Therefore, any association between urban/rural location and indebtedness of firms may cause a 
spurious correlation between bank concentration and loan sizes. To address this concern, we limit 
the sample to urban firms and repeat the original regression. As we can see in the column 3 of the 
Table 4, the estimates from the urban firm sample are consistent with those in baseline 
regressions: The most concentrated market dummy is still statistically significant and the 
magnitude has slightly increased, which suggests that MSA/non MSA location does provide an 
alternative explanation for the finding. 
Another alternative explanation is that the firm size may vary across the bank concentration 
and thus affect the loan size. If firms in concentrated bank markets are smaller due to credit 
constraints, then it may also decrease the average size of L/Cs. To address this problem, we 
created a new variable MRL ratio which is the natural log of the L/C limit divided by total asset 
of the firm and use it as a dependent variable to replace our original dependent variable. The 
estimates presented in the fifth column of Table 4 show no significant changes in the 
concentrated market coefficient, thus ruling out that our finding is driven by firm size differences 
across banking markets.     
Another question that we must address is whether or not the effect of bank competition is 
monotonic. So far we have focused on the differences between the most concentrated market and 
other markets but did not allow the middle market and the most competitive market to differ. To 
test the monotonicity, we added an additional dummy variable for the firms in the most 
competitive banking market. The estimates reported in column 5, however, show that the 
coefficient for the added dummy is not statistically different from zero though it has a positive 
sign. Therefore, we do not find evidence that the effect of bank competition over loan size is 
monotonic.  
Lastly, we need to consider whether the bank market concentration affects young firms and 
old firms differently. Theories surveyed in the previous sections mostly focus on the effects of 
bank concentration on young and small firms. We expect the young firms to be more affected by 
market concentration. When we divide the sample into young (firm age<=10)7 and old urban 
firms (firm age>10), results from OLS estimation and Heckman two-step procedure are quite 
different. In case of OLS, the concentration coefficient is significant only in the old firm sample. 
The coefficient in the young firm sample is still negative and similar in magnitude to that of old 
firm sample but nonetheless is statistically insignificant. Heckman estimates, however, show that 
OLS results are driven by the differences in loan turndown across bank market concentrations and 
after adjustment concentration effect seems to be stronger among young firms.8  
 
3.2. Bank Competition and Loan Turndown 
To test the connection between bank market concentration and credit availability, we need to 
examine the loan turndown rate in addition to the size of granted loans, because it is possible that 
banks may choose to give smaller loans to more firms instead of providing bigger loans to fewer 
firms. This could sway our results, as such actions will reduce the average size of observed loans 
but it does not mean that the total credit provided is smaller.  
This loan turndown test also serves as a robustness check for the loan size regression 
because an alternative explanation for our loan size finding is that the average quality of the firm 
might vary across bank concentrations causing the L/C limits to differ accordingly. If relationship 
banks are more generous in granting loans to small businesses, or if close relationship between 
firms and their relationship banks cause soft-budget problem as suggested by Boot (2000), the 
average quality of firms in the concentrated banking market can be lower than that of firms in the 
competitive market. However, the competing hypothesis – ‘winners’ curse’ problem (Shaffer, 
1999) -  predicts the opposite: average quality of firms in a competitive banking market may be 
lower because intense competition in banking sector coupled with asymmetric information may 
lead banks to fund inferior firms that bank would not have funded otherwise.  
Table 5 shows summary statistics of loan turndown rates. Among various types of loans, 
new L/C application had the highest turndown rate (21.6%), while L/C renewals had the lowest 
rate (2.1%). In both L/C applications, turndown rate was the highest in the most concentrated 
market. However, this difference is statistically insignificant. Also, when we look at the average 
D&B credit rating of firms that were granted a loan in Table 3, we could not find significant 
differences in credit ratings, though the ratings gets slightly better as market concentration 
increases.  
For a more thorough analysis, we perform a Logit analysis of loan turndown. In Logit 
regressions, we use most of the control variables that we used in the loan size regressions except 
for the loan interest rate, collateral requirements and the maturity variables, which are not 
available for rejected loan applications. Also, the size of loan applied for is added to control for 
the effect of loan size on the loan turndown. Results are summarized in Table 6. Estimates in all 
six columns of Table 6 consistently show that banks in concentrated market are more likely to 
reject loan applications from young firms, while there is no significant difference in old firm 
sample. Moreover, results from column 3 and 5 show that banks are more likely to reject L/C 
applications from young firms, especially new L/C applications9: Banks in concentrated markets 
are about 8% and 14% more likely to reject loan and L/C applications from young firms, 
respectively. In case of new L/C application, the difference is 57%.  
While the effect is surprisingly strong, it is not driven by the urban/rural firm difference nor 
is sensitive to the critical firm age that we used to divide the sample. Estimates summarized in 
Table 7 show that the concentration coefficients remain consistent with those in Table 6 when we 
use the whole sample (instead of young and old firms separated) allowing different intercepts and 
age slopes for each level of bank market concentration.10 New firms in concentrated market are 
6% (all loans and all L/Cs) to 40% (new L/Cs) more likely to get rejections and the concentrated 
market effects become stronger in all urban samples. Furthermore, the coefficients of age in the 
most concentrated market are positive and statistically significant (with an exception of New 
L/Cs sample) while the coefficients are much smaller in magnitude and insignificant in the 
competitive markets. This suggests that banks in concentrated markets are especially hard on 
young firms in the area, while firm age does not seem to matter in competitive banking markets.    
This finding has several important implications: First, this result is almost exact opposite of 
what Peterson and Rajan (1995) found in their loan rates regressions. Combined with loan size 
results in the previous section, it directly challenges the notion that concentrated banking market 
may provide better environment for relationship banking and provides support for the argument 
of Boot and Thakor (2000) and Cestone and White (2003) that the bank competition may 
encourage relationship banking. Second, it shows that our loan size finding is not caused by the 
small-loans-to-more-firms strategy of banks. It also confirms that our loan size finding is driven 
by credit supply of banks rather than loan demand of firms. Finally, our finding does not support 
the premise of ‘winner’s curse’ hypothesis. Rather, it suggests the opposite: If all the other things 
are equal, young firms in concentrated markets that secured bank loans should be of higher 
quality than young firms in competitive markets. This also confirms that our loan size finding is 
not driven by differences in firm quality across banking markets.11   
 
3.3. Bank Concentration and Total L/C Limit  
So far we find that banks in concentrated market are more likely to reject loan applications 
and when the amount of granted loans tends to be smaller. In this section, we examine whether 
bank concentration affects the overall amount of credit available to small firms. While the results 
so far would predict that firms get less credit supplied, NSSBF 2003 does not have a variable that 
show the total amount of bank loans a firm has.12 Thus, instead of total debt, we use the sum of all 
the L/C limits a firm has as a proxy. Firms can have more than one L/C to increase their total L/C 
limits and about 18% of firms have more than one L/C issued by commercial banks. We add 
limits of the combined L/Cs of a firm issued by commercial banks to create the dependent 
variable.  
For control variables, we use all the firm and owner variables used in the previous 
regressions. However, due to the fact that many firms have more than one L/C from multiple 
banks, we could not control for variables such as loan maturity, loan interest rate and the types of 
collateral required and firm-bank relationship variables such as length of relationship and firm-
bank distance.13 Instead, we used the number of L/Cs a firm has, number of banks from which the 
firms get L/Cs and the number of L/Cs that required collaterals and guarantors.    
Estimates from the total L/C limit regressions are summarized in Table 8. Specification of 
each column repeats the robustness checks of Table 4: Specification 1 is the baseline regression. 
Specification 2 is based on urban firm sample, Specification 3 has added control of ‘Industry x 
Division’ dummy. Specification 4 checks the effect of firm size and Specification 5 checks the 
monotonicity of the bank concentration effect. Across specifications, estimates consistently show 
that the total L/C limits are lower when firms are located in a concentrated banking market. Our 
finding does not seem to be driven by differences in investment opportunities (Specification 2), 
urban-rural differences (Specification 3) or firm size differences (Specification 5) across banking 
markets. As was, consistent with MRL regressions, the coefficient for the most competitive 
market dummy is not statistically different from zero suggesting that the effect of bank 
competition over loan size may not be monotonic. 
Interestingly, however, when we divide the sample into young (firm age<=10) and old firms, 
the concentration coefficient of the young firm sample is statistically significant and much 
stronger than the estimates from the old firm sample. The total limit of L/Cs of young firms in 
concentrated market is on average 23 percent smaller than the limits of young firms in 
competitive banking markets. In the case of old firms, the difference is only 9.5% and statistically 
insignificant. This result, which is quite different from the estimates of MRL size regressions, 
suggests that the high L/C turndown rate in concentrated bank markets may have contributed 
lowering the total amount of credit granted to young firms in the market.  
To investigate this idea more rigorously, we introduced a selection bias using a two-stage 
Heckman model. Estimates from Heckman regressions are reported in the bottom rows of Table 
8. The Inverse Mills Ratio has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, which suggests 
that there is selection bias. Overall, the Heckman estimates are larger than OLS estimates. Taken 
literally, young firms in concentrated banking market have about 25% lower L/C limits. We 
believe that the reason why the selection bias has a stronger impact on the total L/C limits 
compared to the Most Recent Loan is because a loan turndown will affect the total number of 
L/Cs that a firm has, which cannot be captured in case of the most recent loans.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
We find that market concentration in the commercial banking industry may reduce the 
amount of credit supplied to small businesses in the area. Banks in concentrated markets are more 
likely to reject an L/C application and when they do grant an L/C, the limit of that L/C tends to be 
smaller than the limit of those granted by banks in competitive markets. Also, the concentration 
effect seems stronger among young firms when we look at the combined L/C limits that a firm 
has.  
Our empirical evidence supports the arguments of Boot and Thakor (2000) and Cestone and 
White(2003) that banks with market power may deter entrance of young firms to protect the 
profitability of their existing borrowers. Our finding is also consistent with recent studies such as 
Black and Strahan (2001) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) that emphasize the benefits of 
increased bank competition and banking market deregulation. The policy implications of our 
finding, therefore, should also be in line with these studies. 
The theoretical implications of our finding on relationship banking are not as clear. It may 
simply mean that the market concentration is not a good predictor of relationship banking. Banks 
in concentrated markets may not provide L/Cs to young firms simply because they are not 
interested in relationship banking, while banks in competitive markets engage in relationship 
banking more actively for the reasons that Boot and Thakor (2000) articulate. If this is the case, 
the connection between the banking market concentration and relationship banking practice needs 
to be questioned. Alternatively, it may also signify that banks in concentrated markets are a 
different breed of relationship bank: they are more concerned about protecting their existing 
relationships rather than creating new ones, as Cestone and White (2003) modeled. 
Discriminating these two competing hypotheses is impossible based on our findings in this study 
but it would make a good topic for future research.  
 Table 1. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Variables by Credit Market Structure 
Variable Name Variable Definition Competitive Markets 
Concentrated  
Markets 
Loan Amount Amount of Most Recent Loan  (in millions) 1.131 0.964 
  (4.145) (3.099) 
Assets Book Value of Assets (in millions) 4.558 3.792 
  (14.400) (8.945) 
Sales    Current Year’s Sales (in millions) 8.777 8.063 
  (18.100) (15.700) 
Totemp Total Number of Employees 55.534 50.627 
  (77.179) (67.804) 
Ln(Loan Amount) Natural Log Amount of Most Recent Loan   12.135 11.917 
  (1.923) (1.980) 
Ln(Assets) Natural Log Value of Book Value of Assets 13.575 13.512 
  (2.083) (2.060) 
Ln(Sales)    Natural Log Value of Current Year’s Sales  14.575 14.462 
  (1.942) (1.973) 
Ln(Totemp) Natural Log of Number of Employees 3.176 3.094 
  (1.404) (1.410) 
Ln(ProfitShare)  Natural Log of Profit / Total Sales 0.131 0.127 
  (0.178) (0.176) 
Ln(FirmAge) Natural Log of Firm’s Age in years 2.587 2.640 
  (0.861) (0.836) 
Owner_Educ Average Education of Owners 4.775 4.761 
  (1.836) (1.804) 
Owner_Exper Average Experience of Owners 0.227 0.231 
  (0.108) (0.110) 
Black_Share Share of Black Owners  0.015 0.012 
  (0.116) (0.108) 
Credit_Score Dunn & Bradstreet Credit Score  3.903 4.072 
  (1.456) (1.463) 
Ln(Wealth) Natural Log of Wealth of Primary Owner  3.190 2.422 
  (23.905) (7.351) 
# Institutions # Financial Institutions Firm Has Relationship With 3.761 3.520 
  (2.265) (1.939) 
Ln(Distance) Natural Log of Distance from Bank in Miles 0.034 0.049 
  (0.117) (0.160) 
Ln(Relationship) Natural Log of Length of Relationship with Bank 0.098 0.106 
  (0.101) (0.104) 
Interest Interest Rate of Most Recent Loan Granted  5.570 5.832 
  (2.478) (2.879) 
MSA Status  MSA Status of Firm’s Headquarter (0,1)   1.074 1.399 
  (0.263) (0.490) 
Corporation  Firm is a Corporation (0,1)   0.773 0.765 
  (0.419) (0.424) 
Proprietorship  Firm is a Proprietorship (0,1)   0.139 0.134 
  (0.346) (0.341) 
Observations  775 679 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
 
Table 2. Univariate Regressions Estimates 
 
 All Loans Young Firms (Firm Age≤10) 
Old Firms 
(Firm Age>10) 
All Loans     
 Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.226 -0.505 -0.132 
  (0.103)* (0.186)** (0.122) 
 Observations 1453 455 998 
Bank Loans     
 Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.197 -0.463 -0.112 
  (0.110) (0.199)* (0.131) 
 Observations 1156 346 810 
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses.  
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
Table 3. Baseline Results 
 All Loans Bank Loans L/C Non L/C 
HECKIT ESTIMATES     
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.036 1.521 0.717 1.692 
 (0.269)** (0.287)** (0.356)* (0.599)** 
Ln(Assets) 0.213 0.198 0.224 0.147 
 (0.025)** (0.028)** (0.031)** (0.061)* 
Ln(Sales) 0.401 0.427 0.451 0.218 
 (0.038)** (0.044)** (0.048)** (0.103)* 
Ln(ProfitShare) -0.064 -0.088 -0.191 -0.314 
 (0.174) (0.195) (0.218) (0.420) 
Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.211 -0.175 -0.211 -0.083 
 (0.065)** (0.069)* (0.077)** (0.151) 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.078 -0.093 -0.107 -0.037 
 (0.051) (0.056) (0.062) (0.124) 
Owner_Educ 0.038 0.020 0.011 0.033 
 (0.018)* (0.019) (0.022) (0.042) 
Owner_Exper -0.352 -0.622 -0.199 -0.994 
 (0.360) (0.388) (0.422) (0.876) 
Black_Share -0.472 -0.028 0.043 -0.244 
 (0.281) (0.325) (0.350) (0.807) 
Credit_Score 0.100 0.084 0.072 0.131 
 (0.023)** (0.025)** (0.028)** (0.059)* 
Ln(Wealth) 0.336 0.301 0.307 0.193 
 (0.050)** (0.054)** (0.059)** (0.126) 
#Institutions -0.030 -0.022 -0.027 -0.015 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.039) 
Ln(Distance) 0.217 1.059 1.569 0.483 
 (0.239) (0.431)* (0.607)** (0.640) 
Ln(Relationship) -0.495 -0.186 -0.315 -0.128 
 (0.324) (0.337) (0.389) (0.679) 
Loan Interest Rate -0.079 -0.082 -0.071 -0.118 
 (0.013)** (0.017)** (0.019)** (0.044)** 
MSA Status 0.188 0.234 0.184 0.270 
 (0.077)* (0.084)** (0.096) (0.170) 
Profit Decrease (0,1) 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.047 
 (0.067) (0.072) (0.079) (0.173) 
Profit Same (0,1) -0.060 -0.011 -0.004 0.063 
 (0.081) (0.086) (0.098) (0.182) 
Not in Business (0,1) -0.328 -0.109 -0.137 -0.266 
 (0.228) (0.259) (0.310) (0.494) 
Checking Account (0,1) 0.136 0.245 0.356 -0.091 
 (0.092) (0.121)* (0.145)* (0.236) 
Transaction Service (0,1) -0.134 -0.175 -0.146 -0.153 
 (0.069) (0.072)* (0.078) (0.171) 
Credit Service (0,1) 0.322 0.278 0.323 -0.041 
 (0.091)** (0.093)** (0.101)** (0.222) 
Savings Account (0,1) -0.070 -0.114 -0.193 0.149 
 (0.075) (0.077) (0.086)* (0.178) 
Cash Mgmnt. Service (0,1) 0.450 0.371 0.371 0.146 
 (0.084)** (0.087)** (0.092)** (0.222) 
     
OLS ESTIMATES     
Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.183 -0.158 -0.203 -0.049 
 (0.066)** (0.070)* (0.077)** (0.152) 
Observations 1453 1155 845 310 
Notes: The dependent variable is natural log amount of the most recently granted loan. The 
regression also includes nine industry dummy variables, eight regional dummy variables, 
dummies for loan types, firm’s organization type, services and collateral types and an intercept. 
Standard errors appear in parentheses.  
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
 
Table 3-1. Estimates without Loan Interest Rates 
 All Loans Bank Loans Bank L/C Bank Other 
Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.230** -0.183** -0.217** -0.086 
 (0.066) (0.070) (0.078) (0.153) 
Ln(FirmAge)   -0.067 -0.093 -0.107 -0.025 
 (0.051) (0.057) (0.063) (0.125) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.021** 1.604** 0.789* 1.899** 
 (0.273) (0.289) (0.358) (0.600) 
Observations 1453 1155 845 310 
Notes: The dependent variable is natural log amount of the most recently granted loan. The 
regression all the control variables in Table 3 and nine industry dummy variables, eight regional 
dummy variables, dummies for loan types, firm’s organization type, services and collateral types 
and an intercept. Standard errors appear in parentheses.  
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level , * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
Table 4. Bank Market Concentration and Small Business Profitability 
 WHOLE SAMPLE MOST RECENT LOAN SAMPLE 
 
Competitive  
Market 
Concentrated 
Market 
Competitive  
Market 
Concentrated 
Market 
Profit Change in 3 Years         
 Increase 814 (37.58) 809 (39.01) 288 (43.90) 234 (43.17) 
 Decrease 712 (32.87) 693 (33.41) 233 (35.52) 198 (36.53) 
 Same 360 (16.62) 341 (16.44) 85 (12.96) 72 (13.28) 
 Not in Business 280 (12.93) 231 (11.14) 50 (7.62) 38 (7.01) 
          
Profit Change in 1 Year         
 Increase 781 (36.06) 768 (37.03) 270 (41.16) 217 (40.04) 
 Decrease 704 (32.50) 678 (32.69) 239 (36.43) 191 (35.24) 
 Same 604 (27.89) 563 (27.15) 132 (20.12) 125 (23.06) 
 Not in Business 77 (3.55) 65 (3.13) 15 (2.29) 9 (1.66) 
          
Sales Change in 3 Years         
 Increase 1,010 (46.63) 984 (47.44) 363 (55.34) 319 (58.86) 
 Decrease 569 (26.27) 546 (26.33) 176 (26.83) 122 (22.51) 
 Same 304 (14.04) 311 (15.00) 67 (10.21) 62 (11.44) 
 Not in Business 283 (13.07) 233 (11.23) 50 (7.62) 39 (7.20) 
          
Sales Change in 1 Year         
 Increase 945 (43.63) 892 (43.01) 323 (49.24) 282 (52.03) 
 Decrease 516 (23.82) 493 (23.77) 162 (24.70) 118 (21.77) 
 Same 627 (28.95) 624 (30.09) 155 (23.63) 133 (24.54) 
 Not in Business 78 (3.60) 65 (3.13) 16 (2.44) 9 (1.66) 
Total Observations 2,166 2,074 656 542 
Percentage values reported in parenthesis 
Table 4-1. Robustness Checks  
The dependent variable is natural log amount of the most recently granted loan. The regression also includes all the control variables in 
Table 3 and nine industry dummy variables, eight regional dummy variables, dummies for checking account, credit, transaction, cash 
management and brokerage service, loan types and collateral types and an intercept. Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
 All 
Loans 
Division
*SIC 
Urban 
Sample 
HHI 
Index 
MRL 
Ratio 
Young 
Firms 
Old 
Firms 
10 Mile 
Radius 
5 Mile  
Radius 
OLS ESTIMATES          
Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.183** -0.163* -0.199** -0.184* -0.188* -0.168 -0.169* -0.151* -0.150* 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.072) (0.068) (0.078) (0.132) (0.078) (0.067) (0.067) 
Ln(FirmAge)   -0.118* -0.120* -0.105 -0.118* -0.106 -0.138 -0.122 -0.095 -0.080 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.051) (0.060) (0.122) (0.108) (0.053) (0.054) 
Most Competitive Market    -0.008      
    (0.127)      
Observations 1453 1453 1121 1453 1449 455 998 1343 1292 
          
HECKMAN  ESTIMATES          
Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.211** -0.222** -0.193** -0.210** -0.216** -0.275* -0.157* -0.176** -0.177** 
 (0.065) (0.071) (0.066) (0.066) (0.077) (0.132) (0.077) (0.066) (0.066) 
Ln(FirmAge)   -0.078 -0.074 -0.082 -0.078 -0.066 -0.092 -0.092 -0.054 -0.038 
 (0.051) (0.056) (0.052) (0.051) (0.059) (0.120) (0.106) (0.052) (0.053) 
Most Competitive Market    0.007      
    (0.125)      
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.036** 2.144** 1.945** 2.037** 2.092** 1.921** 2.348** 2.067** 2.107** 
 (0.269) (0.307) (0.276) (0.269) (0.323) (0.465) (0.383) (0.281) (0.283) 
Observations 1453 1453 1121 1453 1449 455 998 1343 1292 
  
Table 5. Pattern of Loan Turndown 
  
Competitive 
Bank Market 
Concentrated 
Bank Market 
            All Loans   
Rejected 85 74 
Accepted 769 664 
Total 853 738 
           Bank Loans   
Rejected 73 63 
Accepted 658 553 
Total 731 616 
New L/C    
Rejected 33 30 
Accepted 126 102 
Total 159 132 
L/C Renewal    
Rejected 6 8 
Accepted 368 281 
Total 374 289 
Other Loans    
Rejected 34 25 
Accepted 164 170 
Total 198 195 
 
 Table 6. Bank Concentration and Loan Rejection 
 All Loans Bank Loans Bank L/Cs New L/Cs 
 Young Old Young Old Young Old Young Old 
Concentrated Market (0,1)   -0.061**  0.004 -0.087**  0.002 -0.141**  0.004 -0.571**  0.024 
 (2.80) (0.94) (2.65) (0.61) (3.21) (1.63) (2.77) (1.26) 
Ln (FirmAge) -0.012  0.003  0.010  0.003  0.034 -0.002  0.072 -0.038 
 (0.81) (0.50) (0.37) (0.56) (1.70) (0.64) (0.26) (1.52) 
Observations 531 1034 427 875 284 638 115 163 
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.42 0.45 
The dependent variable is whether a loan application is accepted (= 1) or not (= 0).  The regression also includes nine industry dummy 
variables, eight regional dummy variables, dummies for loan types and an intercept, except for column 3 where division x 1-digit SIC is 
used. Marginal effects, instead of logit coefficients are reported and t-statistics appear in parentheses. 
 
Table 7. Bank Concentration and Loan Rejection with Different Age Coefficients 
 All Loans Bank Loans L/Cs New L/Cs 
 All Urban All Urban All Urban All Urban 
Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.041* -0.055** -0.061** -0.098** -0.062** -0.129** -0.409* -0.777** 
 (2.54) (2.78) (2.73) (3.06) (3.10) (3.30) (2.39) (2.87) 
Ln(FirmAge) in Competitive  -0.003 -0.006  0.000 -0.006  0.000 -0.003 -0.015 -0.087 
 (0.56) (1.35) (0.02) (0.92) (0.06) (0.79) (0.48) (1.38) 
Ln(FirmAge) in Concentrated  0.012*  0.014*  0.017*  0.023**  0.013**  0.019**  0.091  0.210* 
 (2.00) (2.38) (2.22) (2.68) (2.73) (2.85) (1.55) (2.12) 
Observations 1575 1229 1302 1015 922 740 278 230 
Pseudo R2 0.354 0.387 0.382 0.399 0.448 0.471 0.355 0.397 
The dependent variable is whether a loan application is accepted (= 1) or not (= 0).  The regression also includes nine industry dummy 
variables, eight regional dummy variables, dummies for loan types and an intercept.  
Marginal effects, instead of logit coefficients are reported and t-statistics appear in parentheses. 
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
 
 Table 8. Total L/C Limits and Bank Concentration 
 All Loans Division* SIC 
Urban 
Sample 
HHI 
Index 
L/C Limit to 
Asset 
Young 
Firms 
Old 
Firms 
OLS ESTIMATES        
Concentrated Market (0,1)   -0.128* -0.125* -0.151* -0.120* -0.165* -0.213* -0.095 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.060) (0.057) (0.070) (0.106) (0.065) 
Competitive Market (0,1)     0.071    
    (0.108)    
HECKMAN ESTIMATES        
Concentrated Market (0,1)   -0.189** -0.186** -0.214** -0.181** -0.401** -0.252* -0.165* 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.062) (0.059) (0.068) (0.111) (0.067) 
Competitive Market (0,1)     0.070    
    (0.108)    
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 4.856** 4.800** 5.096** 4.855** 19.233** 3.225 5.797** 
 (1.268) (1.316) (1.522) (1.269) (1.547) (2.517) (1.500) 
Observations 1510 1510 1194 1510 1503 465 1045 
The dependent variable is a natural log sum of limits of all the L/Cs a firm has. The regression also includes nine industry dummy 
variables, eight regional dummy variables, dummies for loan types and an intercept, except for column 3 where division x 1-digit SIC is 
used. Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
 FOOTNOTES 
 
1. We excluded loan applications to non-financial firms and to family members. 
2. Probit estimates on having an L/C (the first step of Heckit two-step procedure) are 
reported in Table 7.  
3. Unlike past waves of NSSBF data sets, 2003 data does not report the sales or profit of 
previous fiscal year. Instead, it asks firms whether the sales or profit has grown, 
decreased, been the same compared to the previous year or firm did not operate during 
the previous year. 
4. Unlike previous version of SSBF data set, 2003 data does not provide actual value of 
sales or profit of the previous year. Therefore, we could not calculate how much profit 
and sales had changed.  
5. Whether we included PROFIT_3, P3 or P3_1 did not make any difference. We did not 
include dummy of each variable at the same time because they are strongly correlated 
with each other. 
6. We also tried 2 digit SIC code instead of industry x division dummies and the results are 
still consistent with baseline regressions. 
7. 10th year is used as a critical year following Peterson and Rajan (1994). 
8. This result is not sensitive to critical firm age of 10 years. Even when we divide the 
sample using the median age of 16 years, we get a consistent result. 
9. We could not test for L/C renewals because of very low turndown rate. There are only six 
L/C renewal rejections in competitive markets and eight in concentrated markets. 
10. We could not test the Industry x Division fixed effect because it makes the number of 
regressors almost equal to the number of total loan rejections. 
11. When we used two-stage Heckman model to control for this selection bias, the estimates 
(not shown) from the second stage regression are very similar to those in Table 3 and the 
coefficient of Inverse Mills Ratio is statistically insignificant. 
12. NSSBF has a total debt variable (variable S1) but the total debt includes debt from 
various institutions and individuals.   
13. Omission of these variables does not seem to drive our total L/C limit results. When we 
check the L/C limits from primary L/C bank, which allows us to control for the length of 
relationship, the distance and the types of collaterals, the results are very similar to ones 
that we got from total L/C limit regressions.   
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